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Abstract—Blockchain technology has drawn attention from
various communities. The underlying consensus mechanism in
Blockchain enables a myriad of applications for the integrity
assurance of stored data. In this paper, we utilize Blockchain
technology to verify the authenticity of a video captured by a
streaming IoT device for forensic investigation purposes. The
proposed approach computes the hash of video frames before
they leave the IoT device and are transferred to a remote base
station. To guarantee the transmission, we ensure that this hash
is sent through a TCP-based connection. The hash is then stored
on multiple nodes on a permissioned blockchain platform. In
case the video is modified, the discrepancy will be detected by
investigating the previously stored hash on the blockchain and
comparing it with the hash of the existing frame in question.
In this work, we present the prototype as proof-of-concept with
experiment results. The system has been tested on a Raspberry
Pi with different quality of videos to evaluate performance. The
results show that the concept can be implemented with moderate
video resolutions.
Index Terms—Video Integrity; Blockchain; IoT device; hyper-
ledger; digital forensics
I. INTRODUCTION
Video scene is a very important material to interrogate a
crime and resolve any dispute because it reveals so much
detailed information about the case [1], [2]. The proliferation
of IoT devices enables convenient video recording opportuni-
ties which can be quickly transferred through the availability
of various wireless communication options. This may include
drones which are used in many smart city applications as well
as other wireless-based cameras deployed on streets/buildings,
including those used by police officers in pursuing crimes [3]
[4].
However, video forgery techniques are so sophisticated that
a video is susceptible to much manipulation, such as being
falsified with insertion or deletion of objects. Advanced video
editing tools allow users to tamper with videos easily and in
visually undetectable ways [5]. In particular, if the video is
being transmitted through wireless channels, this may become
a more prevelant issue as untrusted communication channels
might also be the source for data tampering [6].
Differentiating a tampered video from an authentic one is
now harder than tampering with it. In order to use a video as
evidence in court, the authenticity must be proven. Therefore,
it is important to equip the camera with integrity verification
abilities. There exist various methods to achieve this goal in the
literature. One way is using a digital watermarking technique,
[7] in which an invisible signature is inserted into the video
that can be used to check if it has been modified. Another
approach is analyzing the content itself to detect distortions in
the image [8]. Hashing has also been in use for long time,
where a hash is calculated and distributed along with the
video. While these approaches may address the issue, there
are risks when the data is stored on a server. Data stored on
servers may be subject to unauthorized alterations, especially
if the process of digital evidence gathering and storage is not
followed properly. In addition, if streaming is ongoing, the
video frames are transmitted separately, which may require
individual attention. Therefore, there is a need to ensure the
integrity of video at all levels, from capturing to storage,
so that it can be permissible as evidence in courts, even if
the authenticity of the video is questioned as being fake or
tampered.
Blockchain has emerged as an alternative method to transfer
money between non-trusting participants without having a
trusted third party such as a bank [9]. The idea of creating
a distributed public ledger has led to many other applications
and blockchain has exceeded its original purpose; some people
consider it a game changer. The main idea is to store any data
in a distributed and retroactively unchangeable manner which
will ensure the authenticity of data.
In this paper, we apply this promising idea to verify the
video recorded by wireless-based IoT devices, which can be
used in many scenarios. For example, police officers need to
carry a wearable camera on their shoulder or forehead which
records incidences, and the video footage they capture can
contain evidence that would be useful in court. Similarly,
drone videos of crime or accident scenes can contain forensic
evidence. Drones are also capable of transmitting real-time
video to a base station.
However, videos can be tampered with during transmission
or while stored on a server or other media. Thus, it is necessary
to verify if a video has been changed. This fact has motivated
us to apply blockchain to address the issue. Specifically, the
video data gathered from an IoT device needs to be stored on
Blockchain immediately as it leaves the IoT device. This will
mitigate risk of tampering by eliminating intermediate stages.
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Fig. 1. System Design
Since Blockchains consensus mechanism distributes the data
to all stakeholders, everyone will have the original copy, and
thus no one can modify the data by themselves.
Nevertheless, there are challenges in this approach. Storing
the whole video on a public blockchain is not free due to
transaction fees and blocksize limits. Thus, it is necessary to
calculate the hash of each video frame and only write this
hash to save space. We propose using a reliable communication
protocol to ensure that the hash values will not be lost and thus
advocate the use of TCP protocol while the original video data
can be sent using an unreliable protocol such as UDP.
This is still not a viable option as there are thousands of
frames in videos. Therefore, we opt for a private (i.e., permis-
sioned) Blockchain approach where the distributed ledger is
maintained by a group of stakeholders who are permitted to
become members of the private group. In such a case, the proof
of work for transaction verification will be different, and the
costs will be eliminated. Therefore, we propose using IBM’s
Hyperledger for our purposes that will act as a distributed
storage for our frame hash values.
We implemented the proposed mechanism on a Raspberry
Pi that has a camera using WiFi connection to a server. The
results indicate that the mechanism is feasible and does not
interfere with the performance of the real-time streaming.
This paper is organized as follows: In the next section,
we summarize the related work in the literature. Section
III provides some background on the used concepts while
Section IV presents the system model along with our approach.
In Section V we assess the performance of the proposed
mechanism. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Some recent works in the literature started to investigate the
validation of the integrity of video data for different purposes
using blockchain. The main work in this context is presented
in [13] which tries to protect not only video content but
also camera settings such as angle of camera in surveillance
systems. The authors try to prevent hackers from changing
camera orientation which might either violate the privacy of
neighbors or prevent the recording of some criminal scenes.
They distinguish the background and foreground images.
Background is used to deduce the camera settings by using
some features that do not change over time such as corners
and edges, while the foreground is used to identify events
occurring in the scene. The hash of the video and metadata
is then stored on blockchain. This work’s main concern is
the parameter settings and more importantly it assumes the
availability of the whole video to get the hash. Our goal in
this work is different as we deal with video streaming where
integrity depends on the reliability of each frame as it leaves
the IoT device. Hashing needs to be done in real-time, which
puts burden on the IoT device.
The other closely related work is reported in [14] where
the authors try to provide data assurance for the collected data
through IoT sensors. They calculate the hash of the data and
store it on the blockchain network instead of the whole data.
This work differs from ours as theirs focuses on light text
data instead of video data, and they do not deal with wireless
communication.
III. BACKGROUND
Blockchain: Blockchain is a list of records called blocks,
first proposed by Satoshi for Bitcoin [9]. These blocks are
linked together by containing the hash of the previous block,
while containing the data of the current block. The list of
blocks continues to grow with the addition of new ones as it
is not possible to delete existing blocks. A critical component
of blockchain is that all of these blocks, and the data they
contain, are distributed among many different nodes. These
nodes have to agree on the state of the blockchain, making
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it nearly impossible to modify any data that has been written
to a blockchain. This working scheme of blockchain carries
unique properties such as relieving central authority trust, im-
mutability, and timestamping. These powerful properties are
why blockchain is useful and appropriate to use in verifying
the authenticity of data and video in our case.
Consensus Mechanism: The process of adding a new block
to the chain is carried out via a protocol, which establishes
consensus among participants to confirm the new block. In
other words, it validates the transactions within the block and
provides an agreement on the last state of blockchain. There
are two types of blockchain structure, public and permissioned,
according to the used consensus mechanism [17]. The most
widely-known blockchains, such as Bitcoin and Ethereum fall
into public blockchain category where consensus is established
via a mechanism called Proof-of-Work (PoW). The PoW con-
sensus is typically a form of hash puzzle which requires find-
ing a predefined hash value. This consensus protocol brings a
significant level of security on the chain (withstand up to 50%
of nodes are being malicious), but at the cost of computational
power and time. For instance, Bitcoin’s maximum throughput
is 7 transactions per second and the consensus finality can take
an hour. On the other hand, permissioned blockchains utilize
some kind of Byzantine fault tolerant voting based algorithm
as consensus mechanism, such as Practical Byzantine Fault
Tolerance (PBFT) [16] or Stellar Consensus Protocol (SCP)
[15], which do not require computationally expensive hash
puzzles. As a result, reaching a consensus is faster which
means higher transaction throughput. However, permissioned
blockchains generally require more than two-thirds of nodes
to be trustworthy rather than 51%.
Voting based consensus protocol: Voting based consensus
protocol first emerged in distributed computing [16] to provide
reliability of data or computation, even if arbitrary nodes
conduct malicious actions or fail. Permissioned blockchain
mechanisms adapt the same idea to establish consensus where
some of some nodes may act maliciously. In this setting,
where there are n nodes, a consensus can be achieved if
at least (2n − 1)/3 number of nodes act honestly. Honesty
means providing correct information to the other participants.
In a permissioned blockchain, there are two different types of
nodes called Leader and Validator. First, a randomly selected
Leader builds a block from transactions. This block is then
distributed by the leader to Valitador nodes for verification.
Validators check the transactions within the block, sign it, and
distribute it again to the other Validators, as shown in Fig. 2.
Each node, again, distributes the block captured from the
other node. This continues until each Validator node collects
individually signed versions of the block from the other ones.
After n − 1 version of blocks are gathered, the Validators
check differences between blocks. If (2n − 1)/3 of these
blocks are valid, the Validator nodes inform the Leader about
confirmation and add the block to its local chain.
Hyperledger: Hyperledger [11] is an opensource platform,
distrubuted ledger founded by Linux Foundation and supported
by over 50 companies including IBM, Intel. It is implementing
Fig. 2. An illustration of how BA protocol works with replicated nodes.
permissioned blockchain technology by utilizing a voting
based consensus protocol called Practical Byzantine Fault
Tolerance (PBFT). It is a permissioned blockchain platform
where access is restricted to stakeholders unlike the public
blockchain where anyone can access the produced blocks. A
permissioned blockchain would make more sense for this use
case, where only certain entities can access and modify the
data stored on the blockchain.
IV. PROPOSED APPROACH
We propose a method that leverages the blockchain concept
to improve video integrity and to detect tampered video
captured by drones. The idea can be accomplished by storing
the video frames on a blockchain, which would make it
immutable: no one can change it, thus it can be used as
evidence for forensic purposes. However, video frames are too
big to put on a blockchain, so we take hashes of video frames
and put them on a blockchain. These hashes are immutable and
can later be used to verify the video. They are sent from the
IoT device directly to the blockchain to prevent any alteration
during data transmission. Fig. 1 illustrates the approach that
we propose in detail using a drone video communication
application. The drone equipped with a camera captures a
video frame by frame.
A. Hash Computation
The hash calculations occur on the IoT device itself so
that any intervention by adversaries with the video during
transmission will be detected. The hash is calculated either for
each frame or for a sequence of frames before it is transferred.
However, hashing each frame and sending it to blockchain
might be costly in terms of computation and time. Thus, we
try various optimization methods to reduce the total time and
to handle higher quality videos.
To get the hash of a frame, the frame is first converted to
a string value and then a hash is calculated on this string.
Therefore, conversion from frame to string and hashing the
string can take a lot of time, especially if this is done for
each and every frame. As this will limit the quality of the
videos that can be processed, we propose to perform frame
selection by adjusting the number of frames we select for
hashing. In this respect, one potential approach is to focus on
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I-frames which are the frames that cannot be encoded using
popular encoding techniques such as MPEG or H.264. As the
number of such frames would be lower, this will reduce the
computation time and eliminate the necessity to store each
frames’ hash. When a video is encoded, it is converted to
GOPs (Group of Pictures) which consists of I, B and P frames.
Only I-frames are complete images, B and P frames reflect the
changes from surrounding I-frames.
B. Communication of the Hashes
Since the hash of a frame is a crucial element to be stored
in blockchain, it needs to be transmitted in a reliable manner.
Therefore, we propose that the IoT device will open a TCP
connection to hyperledger so that any loss value could be re-
transmitted through the wireless channel. The video frames
are typically sent via UDP as it is better suited for video
streaming, although this may cause some of the frames to
be lost. Therefore, each frame ID will also be appended to the
hash in order to be able to compare it with the hash computed
for the frame at the server. Any missing IDs will be discarded
on the blockchain.
C. Writing to Blockchain
In a permissioned Blockchain, there need to be members.
For this work, we assumed that there may be three peer
organizations in the hyperledger network: 1) Related court
unit; 2) Police Department; and 3) Local fire departments.
Note that the number of participants can be increased de-
pending on the nature of the application if needed, but to
enable any proof of work algorithm, it should not be less than
three. These members will execute the Hyperledger transaction
verification process through voting. If there are fewer than
three participants, then it would not make sense to use a
permissioned blockchain, a public blockchain should be used
instead; however, the transaction costs associated with a public
blockchain must be considered.
D. Integrity Verification
Later when it comes to use this video as evidence in court,
the same hashing process is repeated for the stored video
frames. Using the frame number as an index, each frame can
be queried in the hyperledger which will return the original
hash computed and stored in hyperledger. If the hashes match,
the frame is authentic; if they do not match, it can be inferred
that the video is a fake or altered video. The stored hash is
secure because it is distributed on all stakeholders and they
agree on its correctness. If any stakeholder is compromised,
the other nodes will still provide the correct information.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Experiment Setup
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed ap-
proach, we set up a testbed and performed various tests. We
used a Raspberry Pi3 to simulate a drone, or similar IoT
device. It ran the code that would be installed on a drone
equipped with a camera. This setup is illustrated in Fig 3.
To ensure consistency in our tests, we stored prerecorded
videos of various resolutions on the Raspberry. We also
set up a hyperledger network with three participants. The
hyperledger network runs on a laptop and communication is
achieved through Wi-Fi. The performance greatly depends on
the hardware. Raspberry Pi3 B+ specs shown in Table I are
used to run the experiments. Therefore, the values in the results
are specific to this configuration. We used OpenCV [18] to
process the frames. And we employed MD5 hash function for
hashing purposes.
Fig. 3. System Implemenentation
TABLE I
RASPBERRY PI 3 SPECIFICATIONS
CPU(SoC) BCM2837B0 quad-core A53 1.4GHz
RAM 1GB LPDDR2 SDRAM
Networking 2.4GHz and 5GHz 802.11b/g/n/ac Wi-Fi
We used 6 different resolutions of the same prerecorded
video to be precise in measurements. It is a 10 second video
in mp4 format which has 303 frames in total. MPEG is used as
the encoding function. The size and resolution of each version
is shown in Table II. Each video has different resolutions; thus,
they vary in size, which will affect processing and transmission
time. Since the Raspberry has limited computational and
memory capacity, the frame size will impact the performance
significantly.
TABLE II
VIDEO PROPERTIES
version resolution size
v1 256x134 156 KB
v2 426x224 350 KB
v3 640x338 576 KB
v4 854x450 1.31 MB
v5 1280x674 2.73 MB
v6 1920x1012 5.71 MB
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Fig. 4. Experiment Results
B. Metrics and Baselines
The main metric we are concerned with is the time to
process and stream the videos. We considered both the com-
putation time on the IoT device and communication time. The
other metric is the resolution of the videos used.
As a baseline, we considered different numbers of frames
to be hashed. Specifically, frequency of frames ranging from
1/30 (one frame from each second) to 30/30(each frame) are
considered. We also compared our approach on Raspberry PI
to that on a more powerful machine such as a desktop.
C. Performance Results
First, we assessed the video capturing and transmission
time of the Raspberry without having any additional processes
running on it. Fig 4.a shows the time needed for a Raspberry
to capture and transmit the frames to a server over WiFi.
It took 14.25 seconds to capture a 10 second video in the
highest quality which means that there will be pauses when
we stream it. This indicates that it is not possible to record
video in this resolution using a Raspberry even with no other
processes slowing it down. A lower resolution video will
help the hardware handle the process smoothly. Transmitting
the frame from IoT device to a remote station is the next
step. The transmission time depends on the quality of the
communication channel. Current congestion level, protocol,
distance, transmission environment are some factors that can
effect the time. In our case, the IoT device connects to the
server through a router using WiFi. We tried UDP and TCP
connections and did not change other parameters, as that is
not the purpose of this study. Both UDP and TCP gave very
similar results as shown in Fig. 4.a and this is almost negligible
compared to computation overhead for capturing the video.
It should be noted that the video is in mp4 format. Another
encoding technique might generate a different size for the
same quality which will effect the transmission time.
The next thing we analyzed is string conversion and the
hashing process. Fig 4.b shows the time for capturing and
converting the frames to string for each video. It seems
conversion to string is an intensive process which adds a lot
to the total time, especially for larger frames. If all frames
are processed, the total time for the highest resolution reaches
around 80 seconds. Only the lowest 3 resolutions are under
10 seconds. If we consider processing only selected frames
instead of each frame, then the task can be completed faster.
If only two frames each second are converted, then all the
resolutions except the highest one can be handled. The hashing
process involves first converting the frame to a string, and then
taking the hash of the string.
Table III lists approximate times for conversion and hashing
of a single frame based on the frame size. It takes almost half
a second to convert and hash a video frame in 1920x1012.
The results indicate that hashing takes less time once string
conversion is done. Fig 4.c shows the total time needed for all
the tasks together. Low resolution videos (v1=256x134 and
v2=426x224) are handled within the time limit even when
all the frames are processed, but higher resolutions require
frame selection which lets us go all the way up to v5 without
exceeding the time limit. If all frames are needed to check
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TABLE III
PROCESSING TIMES
resolution conversion(ms) hashing(ms)
256x134 3.8 2.9
426x224 10.3 7.7
640x338 23.3 17.6
854x450 42.9 31.7
1280x674 97.1 70.8
1920x1012 223.2 159.6
integrity, we can achieve it only for for v1 and v2.
Recall that there was another concern to to take into
consideration. Storing hash of every frame in hyperledger
might be costly and unattractive even though we are able to do
so. Hence, we tested two other options: 1) appending strings
from each frame so that we will have only one string to be
hashed for every 30 frames; 2) appending the hash of each
frame to be hashed and stored in blockchain. That means, we
connect to the blockchain once for every 30 frames. Basically
here, we take all the frames into consideration in two different
ways, but we only need to write to blockchain occasionally. We
tested these two options to see the performance, as is shown
in Fig 4.d. We can achieve both options for v1 and v2 under
10 seconds while the second option performs a little better
because the string does not get too big.
We also considered using different hash functions. The
experiments up to now have been performed using MD5. We
wanted to test another one to see if it makes a difference.
Thus, we employed SHA256 instead of MD5. The results
Fig 4.e shows the total time using two different hashing
functions while processing each frame. MD5 outperforms
SHA256 in terms of speed. The difference indicates that
developing lightweight specific hashing algorithms for video
enables higher quality videos to be transmitted.
The last thing we wanted to investigate is how the whole
process would run on a regular computer, which has more
powerful resources to improve performance. We ran the pro-
gram on a machine with i5 quadcore CPU and 6 GB RAM.
Fig 4.f shows the comparison for the highest resolution, v6,
with every frame processed. The performance on PC, espe-
cially for higher resolutions, is much better than on Raspberry.
If the idea is applied on higher capacity machines for any
surveillance purposes, it can allow for higher quality recording.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed and implemented a system to
verify the integrity of a video captured by wireless IoT devices
by incorporating blockchain. The idea was for a video that
is being streamed, to generate the hash values for individual
frames and write those hashes in a distributed ledge, before
the frames are transmitted. We implemented the system in
a real setup with Hyperledger as the blockchain technology.
The experiment results indicate that the idea is promising and
usable as long as the right video resolution is picked. Further
investigation is needed to handle higher resolution videos.
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